The Armed Forces of Ukraine

Is it true that Russia is fighting “at half strength” and has not yet used its full potential?

Published

14.10.2025

No, that is not true. Despite the Kremlin’s loud claims about “restraint” on the battlefield and waging war “at half strength,” Russia is showing clear signs of deep exhaustion — both militarily and economically.

Russia is losing weapons and ammunition far faster than it can produce them, leading to a rapid depletion of its Soviet-era stockpiles. As a result, the country is increasingly dependent on arms and raw material supplies from North Korea, China, and Iran.

Its slow advance along the front line comes at the cost of enormous human losses, which already exceed by fivefold the combined casualties suffered by Russia and the USSR in all wars fought between the end of World War II and the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the national economy — where more than half of budget revenues are now directed toward the war — has virtually reached a state of stagnation.

Despite the mobilization of Russia’s defense-industrial complex that has continued since 2022, the Russian army in its war against Ukraine continues to expend more ammunition and equipment than its industry can supply — and this imbalance is only deepening.

For example, while around 10 million artillery shells were used in 2022 alone, Russia managed to replenish its stockpiles by only 2–2.5 million shells in 2023, and by no more than 4.5 million in 2024.

Russian tank losses have reached approximately 4,000 units, whereas the country’s industrial capacity to produce new or modernized tanks is estimated at 200–300 units per year, or up to 1,000–1,500 annually if actively restoring vehicles withdrawn from storage.

At the same time, reserves of Soviet-era armored vehicles in storage are rapidly depleting. According to RUSI estimates, by the end of 2024 Russia retained only about half of its pre-war tank reserves, given that most equipment suitable for repair has already been exhausted.

Russia’s inability to provide its army with sufficient resources is forcing it to increasingly rely on supplies from allied countries such as North Korea, Iran, and China.

In particular, in 2024, about 52% of the “explosives” delivered to Russian arsenals were shipped from Nakhodka — a port on the Sea of Japan used by North Korea. The volume of shipments from this region has grown from zero before the war to 250,000 tons in 2024.

These figures corroborate the assessment made by Ukraine’s Chief of Military Intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, who stated that 40% of Russia’s ammunition now originates from North Korea.

According to KSE analysis, Russia has also received approximately 13,000 tons of explosives from Iran. Meanwhile, China remains the largest supplier of dual-use goods to Russia, exporting over $300 million worth of such items each month (according to Carnegie Politika).

These supplies include critical components that Russia cannot produce domestically — such as microelectronics, machine tools, optics, and radar systems — all essential for the production of missiles, drones, and tanks.

Despite these efforts, Russia’s advances along the front line come at an enormous cost and yield minimal results.

Since January 2024, Russia has managed to capture less than 1% of Ukraine’s territory (around 5,000 square kilometers), while suffering the loss of 1,149 armored combat vehicles, 3,098 infantry fighting vehicles, 300 self-propelled artillery systems, and 1,865 tanks.

Even more tellingly, Russian equipment losses continue to significantly exceed those of Ukraine, with the ratio ranging from 5:1 to 2:1 in Ukraine’s favor.

Moreover, the summer offensive promised by President Putin, which was supposed to become a “decisive phase” of the invasion, has failed to achieve any breakthrough along the front line or capture a single major city.

Overall, Russia’s total territorial gains amounted to approximately 0.3% of Ukraine’s territory over three months, accompanied by tens of thousands of personnel losses.

At the same time, the overall human losses of the Russian army since the start of the full-scale invasion have reached around one million killed and wounded as of the summer of 2025 — hardly an indication of “restraint” or “economy of force.”

In particular, the number of Russian military personnel killed — approximately 250,000 — is five times greater than the combined losses suffered by Russia and the Soviet Union in all wars fought between the end of World War II and the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

These losses are also 15 times higher than those sustained during the Soviet Union’s ten-year war in Afghanistan, and ten times higher than the casualties of Russia’s thirteen-year war in Chechnya.

Moreover, Russia’s invasion is taking an increasingly severe toll on the aggressor state’s economy.

As of August 2025, military expenditures for the first time have exceeded 50% of Russia’s total revenues, while the federal budget deficit has reached a new record high of $47 billion — six times greater than during the same period in 2024.

At the same time, Russia’s GDP growth in the first half of 2025 slowed elevenfold, down to 0.4%, indicating a state of virtual economic stagnation.

The fact that Russia’s economy is on the brink of recession was also acknowledged by the country’s Minister of Economic Development, Maksim Reshetnikov, during his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

Therefore, the claim that Russia is fighting “at half strength” is false and does not reflect the actual situation either on the battlefield or within the aggressor’s economy.

On the contrary, all available evidence indicates that Russia has already committed a substantial portion of its resources, yet continues to fail to achieve its objectives due to their rapid depletion and systemic inefficiency.