International Conventions in Russia’s War Against Ukraine
Which international conventions governing the conduct of war does Russia violate?
Published 30.09.2026
In more than four years of full-scale war against Ukraine, Russia has systematically and gravely violated at least five key international treaties governing the conduct of war: the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; the Third Geneva Convention, which establishes rules for the treatment of prisoners of war; the Chemical Weapons Convention; the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which prohibits the use of weapons deemed to cause excessive injury or have indiscriminate effects; and the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property. These are not isolated incidents, but recurring practices documented by international organisations, journalists and human rights defenders.
The Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) protects civilians during wartime. Russia violates it regularly and in the most brutal manner, carrying out missile and drone strikes on residential buildings, hospitals—including the strike on the Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital in Kyiv—schools, energy infrastructure and shopping centres. The forcible deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation constitutes a separate and particularly grave crime. It was specifically in connection with this crime that the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin. According to available information, some of the deported children are being prepared for service in the Russian armed forces—in effect, trained to fight against their own country. Russia also blocks humanitarian corridors and denies international missions access to occupied cities, even shelling Red Cross warehouses.
The Third Geneva Convention (1949) establishes rules for the treatment of prisoners of war. Violations include the mass execution of Ukrainian soldiers attempting to surrender and, according to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission, the torture and starvation endured by more than 90% of Ukrainian prisoners of war held in Russia. A separate case is the 2022 terrorist attack at Olenivka—the deliberate destruction of a barracks housing captured defenders of Azovstal—as well as the show trials of members of the Azov Regiment, which Russia uses as an instrument of propaganda.
The Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) is also being violated. As confirmed by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Russian military regularly uses grenades filled with tear-gas and irritant agents, including chloropicrin, on the battlefield.
The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1980) restricts weapons deemed to cause excessive injury or have indiscriminate effects. Russia extensively mines civilian facilities, disguising booby traps as household objects and toys. It also uses phosphorus and thermite munitions against populated areas, as documented during the battles for Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
Finally, the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954) has been violated through the destruction of the Mariupol Drama Theatre, damage to the Transfiguration Cathedral in Odesa and the destruction of the Maria Prymachenko Museum in Ivankiv, as well as the widespread looting of museums in Kherson, Melitopol and Mariupol, from which Scythian gold and other historical artefacts were removed. Separately, experts classify the blowing up of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant in June 2023 as ecocide—the deliberate destruction of the environment during wartime—which caused a large-scale humanitarian and environmental disaster.
How does Russia violate international conventions governing the treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war?
Published 30.09.2026
Russia’s treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war constitutes one of the best-documented and most systematic patterns of violations of international humanitarian law in this war: a terrorist attack on a detention facility, mass executions on the battlefield, pervasive torture, starvation, mutilation, show trials and isolation from the Red Cross. These are not isolated abuses, but a consistent state practice.
The terrorist attack at Olenivka. On the night of 29 July 2022, a barracks at the prison colony in occupied Olenivka, Donetsk region, where defenders of Azovstal were being held, was blown up. At least 50 Ukrainian service members were killed and more than 130 were seriously wounded. The UN mission established to investigate the terrorist attack was disbanded on 5 January 2023 because it had never been able to visit the prison colony: Russia refused to provide access. This constitutes a direct violation of Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention, which protects prisoners of war against acts of violence and wilful killing, and Article 23, which prohibits holding prisoners of war in a combat zone or using them as “human shields”.
Mass executions on the battlefield. Russian troops regularly shoot Ukrainian soldiers who have laid down their weapons and raised their hands—and are therefore already under the protection of the Convention. One of the most widely reported documented cases was the execution of Oleksandr Matsievskyi in March 2023. In the video, the unarmed soldier is heard saying “Glory to Ukraine!” before he is killed in a burst of automatic gunfire.
Pervasive torture, starvation and mutilation. According to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission, more than 95% of Ukrainian prisoners of war held in Russia are subjected to systematic torture. Those released from captivity suffer from critical levels of emaciation caused by deliberate starvation. They are subjected to electric shocks, beatings, psychological pressure, mock executions and sleep deprivation. A striking example is provided by the photographs of Mariupol defender Mykhailo Dianov before and after his captivity, which were seen around the world. This violates three provisions of the Convention at once: Article 13 on humane treatment, Article 14 on respect for the person and honour of prisoners of war, and Article 26 on adequate food.
Show “trials”. Russia uses the courts as instruments of propaganda and intimidation. Puppet courts and Russian federal courts impose sentences—including life imprisonment—on members of the Azov Regiment, marines and personnel from other units on fabricated “terrorism” charges merely for defending their country. This violates Articles 85 and 99: prisoners of war have combatant immunity and cannot be convicted merely for participating in hostilities unless they have committed war crimes.
Isolation from the Red Cross. Russia systematically conceals the conditions in which Ukrainians are being held. It denies representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross full and regular access to detention facilities, both in the occupied territories and within the Russian Federation. Prisoners are forbidden from corresponding with their relatives, while their families may spend years not knowing whether their loved one is alive or where they are being held. This violates Article 71, which guarantees the right to correspondence, and Article 126, which guarantees ICRC representatives the right to visit all places of detention without restriction.
Why does Ukraine provide Russian prisoners of war with decent conditions despite all the harm they have caused?
Ukraine holds Russian prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Special camps have been established far behind the front lines, where prisoners receive three meals a day, medical care, the opportunity to call their relatives and the right to work if they wish. The facilities are regularly visited by representatives of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Respecting international law in the treatment of prisoners—even though these people fought against Ukrainians—is a deliberate civilisational choice made by Ukraine despite all the pain experienced by a society that has lost loved ones. It is also a necessary condition for receiving full support from democratic partners.
What is provided in practice. Special camps and designated sections administered by the Ministry of Justice have been established for Russian prisoners of war. They are located far behind the front lines, as required by the Convention. Prisoners receive three meals a day and medical care, including monthly examinations, outpatient and inpatient treatment and, when necessary, treatment at facilities outside the Ministry of Justice system. They are able to call their relatives regularly and have the right to work if they wish; officers may work only with their consent. The camps are equipped with sleeping quarters, dining halls, medical units, bathing facilities, libraries, workshops and shelters. They even have infrastructure for people with disabilities. According to the Ministry of Justice, holding one prisoner costs the state approximately UAH 10,000 per month.
The facilities are regularly visited by representatives of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross, who inspect temperature conditions, daily routines, food and medical care. In its 2024 annual report, the ICRC confirms that it continues to visit these facilities in Ukraine systematically to monitor the conditions in which Russian prisoners of war are held. Following these monitoring visits, Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights Dmytro Lubinets has repeatedly confirmed that the conditions comply with the requirements of the Geneva Convention and that Ukraine remains open to international organisations. This is also confirmed by an audit conducted by the Accounting Chamber.
The contrast with what happens to Ukrainian prisoners in Russia is striking. According to consolidated data from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission concerning prisoners of war, independent international observers continue to be denied access, either entirely or to a significant extent, to facilities where Ukrainians are held in the Russian Federation, while the information provided to their families is inconsistent, incomplete and delayed. There, more than 90–95% of prisoners are subjected to torture and starvation and are denied contact with their relatives for years, while some, as in Olenivka, are killed outright.
Ukraine acts in this way, rather than “like the Russians”, for several reasons. First, it is a matter of fundamental civilisational choice. Respecting the conventions—even though Russia has not formally declared war and could therefore use this as a pretext for disregarding international law—once again underlines that Ukraine is not the Russian Federation and that, even in the most difficult war for its own existence, it does not descend to the aggressor’s level in its treatment of people who are entirely in its power. This is a painful decision for some Ukrainians, as many have lost loved ones and cannot always view reports of “comfortable conditions” for the enemy objectively. But that is precisely why this is a principled rather than an emotional decision: it is made consciously, not because society is free from pain, but despite that pain.
Second, it is in the state’s direct interests. Respect for international humanitarian law is a necessary condition for receiving full support from democratic partners. If Ukraine were to behave like the aggressor, it would lose the moral right to ask the world to support it and condemn Russia. Moreover, the humane treatment of Russian prisoners increases the chances of genuine rather than staged prisoner exchanges and of Russia being recognised as the responsible party by international institutions.
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